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Working memory theory remains stuck: Reply to Hanley and Young 
 
Hanley and Young (in press) criticize my representation of ELD’s case (Morey, 
2018) and my skepticism about whether proposing a specialized visual short-term 
memory (STM) store is necessary. They provide welcome detail supplementing their 
original reports (Hanley, Pearson, & Young, 1990; Hanley, Young, & Pearson, 1991). 
However, I argued from many sources of evidence (Morey, 2018) that hypothesis 
testing about visual STM has not confirmed the assumptions guiding interpretation 
of evidence from neurological patients. I still doubt whether ELD’s case compels 
belief in a visual-spatial STM store, and think that retaining this idea likely impedes 
progress toward understanding working memory (WM). 
Though ELD could recognize familiar visual materials, her memory was 
impaired for novel faces and spatial layouts (Hanley et al., 1990). Hanley and Young 
(in press) describe how Baddeley hypothesized that ELD’s visuospatial sketchpad, 
which may be used to temporarily represent novel visual information, might have 
been damaged. Indeed, when tested on a spatial STM task, ELD showed impairments 
(Hanley et al., 1991). Hanley et al. concluded that ELD could not learn novel visual-
spatial materials because they could not be adequately represented in damaged 
visual STM.  
I argued that ELD’s unimpaired memory for arbitrary instances of familiar 
objects was relevant for assessing whether a visual STM store was impaired (Morey, 
2018), and Hanley and Young’s (in press) logic confirms this. According to Hanley 
and Young, ELD only recognized visual detail associated with familiar objects 
because she could activate these representations in long-term memory. But consider 
their stimuli more closely, and this explanation seems unsatisfying. ELD certainly 
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had not previously stored these precise instances of familiar objects in long-term 
memory. She viewed them in novel positions and nonetheless managed to 
distinguish exact matches from similar lures. Hanley and Young do not specify how 
activating the concept of, e.g., binoculars, provoked encoding of the novel visual 
details needed to distinguish a specific set of binoculars arranged in a particular 
manner from other similar instances. If encoding these novel visual details does not 
likewise involve temporary representation, then it remains unknown how ELD 
remembered these: simply saying she used long-term memory does not suffice.    
To conclude that ELD's pattern reflects selectively impaired visual STM, we 
must assume that visual STM exclusively encodes novel features: this is possibly an 
important distinction worth pursuing. However, if this was what we learned from 
ELD’s case, it has not really influenced how the visuospatial sketchpad is described 
(e.g., Logie, 2011 does not mention novelty) or measured (e.g., see stimuli of Logie et 
al., 2010). Closed sets of familiar shapes and colors, which are certainly not novel, 
are commonly used to measure visual STM. Hanley and Young (in press) suggest the 
crucial point is that ELD only showed intact memory for familiar materials across 
delays of many minutes, rather than milliseconds, implying that their task primarily 
measured long-term memory. But as they never reported ELD’s memory for 
instances of familiar visual materials across briefer delays, we simply do not know 
whether she could temporarily represent novel arrangements of familiar elements or 
not. The spatial sequence and the Brooks matrices tasks reported by Hanley et al. 
(1991) differ from recognition tasks in non-trivial ways, and do not necessarily isolate 
storage processes.  
Admittedly, this does not mean that there is definitely no such thing as a 
visuospatial sketchpad. I questioned (Morey, 2018) whether the cases of ELD and 
comparable neurological patients compel belief in a specialized visual STM store, and 
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I maintain that the case evidence implicating visual or spatial STM remains too 
ambiguous to restrict WM theory. Though the most salient thing about ELD's 
impairment appears to be that visual and spatial materials were strongly affected, 
how retention time affected her memory remains vague, and we furthermore know 
that she also showed deficits for aural materials. Her deficits may be consistent with 
an impairment to visual-spatial STM, but her case does not rule out some other yet-
to-be-investigated possibility. Hanley and Young (in press) argue that until 
alternative hypotheses are tested, their conclusions about WM structure should 
stand. But cases like ELD’s are unique, so alternative hypotheses may never be tested 
again under identical circumstances. Rather than wait for an opportunity, we must 
reconsider how we use neurological patient evidence to restrict WM theory in light of 
the broader range of evidence available. 
Hanley and Young (in press) also provide new analyses suggesting that ELD’s 
spatial STM was indeed significantly worse than normal. But performance on Corsi-
block tasks do not necessarily isolate short-term storage. Hanley et al. (1991) 
observed that ELD's memory for the final spatial item in a sequence appeared 
remarkably poor. Nevertheless, it is unknown whether this pattern reflects impaired 
representation of recent images or poor ability to manage output interference. The 
latter would be consistent with explanations that do not implicate visual STM 
specifically. Data from recall tasks, such as those used to measure verbal STM 
deficits, are not directly comparable with data from order reconstruction tasks like 
Corsi-blocks (Ward, Avons, & Melling, 2005). This means that ELD’s apparent 
dissociation between memory for verbal and non-verbal materials might arise from 
other differences between the tasks.  
In summary, Hanley and Young (in press) provide new information and 
context about ELD's case. But their view of WM theory remains frozen, and they 
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seem unworried that the same decades-old debates around the existence of 
specialized stores still churn without resolution. The accumulated literature suggests 
that visual short-term memories, much more so than verbal short-term memories, 
are fragile and prone to interference from many sources even in healthy participants 
(Morey, 2018). Baddeley (Baddeley, 2012; Baddeley & Hitch, in press) aptly likens 
theory-building to mapping an unknown territory. If our guiding assumptions are 
correct, exploration should confirm them. We should gradually add new knowledge, 
not contradictory information. When we hit a stubborn incongruity, we must re-
consider the initial assumption. Continuing down the apparent path toward 
specifying a distinct visual-spatial STM store has not yielded a better, more complete 
map of this territory. It is time to seriously consider changing direction. 
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